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Abstract: Matsukata Masayoshi's decision to bring Japan upon the gold standard has often been presented as the
self-evident result of his insight in some imperfections endemic to the silver standard and bimetallism. Turning to
Marc  Flandreau's  refutation  of  the  view  that  the  growth  toward  an  international  gold  standard  system was
preordained, this article inquires its consequences for discussions of Japan's late nineteenth century monetary
situation.  I argue that Matsukata's policies should not be discussed in terms of the assumed superiority of one
standard over another, but should be studied as a political choice with respect to Japan's place in the world, both
strategically  (as  an  imperialist  power)  and  economically  (namely  as  economic  partner  of  the  gold  standard
countries).
I. Introduction
As explained in the former chapter, Matsukata Masayoshi's stay in Belgium was of seminal
importance for Japan's financial future, especially where it concerns the construction of a banking
infrastructure with a firmly organized central bank in its core. But Matsukata's historical learning
must have stretched beyond the emulation of the Banque Nationale de Belgique. As a matter of fact,
the decennium between 1870 and 1880 is a  clearly demarcated period in continental  European
financial history as well —a point rarely touched upon by Japanese historians or Western students
of  Meiji  Japan. It  marks a shift  from the somewhat  moderate  pre-1870 liberalisms to the grim
nationalisms that had their heydays in the first half of the twentieth century.1 L'Empire c'est la Paix,
1 See, especially, Polanyi,K., The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time (Boston, 1957). I will come back to the importance of this point in my discussion of the
origin of Japan’s gold standard.
1
the motto of the 1867 Paris Exhibition, and the expression of the belief that future warfare would be
waged on the market,  was eventually shattered to pieces.2 Its  fissures  originated in the conflict
between continental  Europe's  political  and economic hothouses:  the Franco-German war (1870-
1871) bore the seed of a wide range of opposites that would plague European political, cultural, and
economic (including monetary and financial) organization for the following eighty years.  As we
will see in this and the following chapter, there exists no doubt that Matsukata and especially his
aide Katō Wataru  加藤済 , who stayed in Belgium from 1878 until 1881 (cf. supra), must have
learnt  of this profound transformation, if  only because both the war and the chain of monetary
events in its aftermath received considerable attention at the time.3 According to Tamaki Norio,
Japanese banking historian and instrumental in drawing Western attention to fiscal and monetary
matters in the process of Japan's modernization,
 
'Matsukata's  European  journey  was  to  prove  a  crucial  educational  experience.  [...]  [He]  [...]
witnessed the collapse of the bimetallic Latin Monetary Union led by the French. From this date he
was  suspicious  of  bimetallism,  that  is  the  double  gold-and-silver  standard.  And,  perhaps  most
significantly, while in Europe, Matsukata learnt that the Germans had successfully based their gold
standard upon the French indemnity paid in the aftermath of the Franco-German War. It was no
surprise,  therefore,  that  from this  date Matsukata started to dream of  putting Japan on the gold
standard.'4
The strategy of employing indemnity in order to move onto a different standard cannot be discussed
here; as it is a matter of considerable complexity, it will be the theme of the next chapter. Instead,
we will concentrate on Matsukata's obstinate preference for the gold standard, and especially its
assumed  obviousness.  Indeed,  almost  all  studies  at  least  latently  presuppose  that  Matsukata's
adherence to gold monometallism must be considered a self-evident decision, and the result of his
sound understanding  of  the  course  of  monetary  matters  at  the  time.  In  another  paper,  Tamaki
reiterates his view of the demise of bimetallism with an argument that has also been quite common
in  Western  studies  of  the  period.  The  sharply  rising  production  of  silver,  he  says,  created  a
monetary  version  of  Gresham's  Law:  gold  value  rose,  and  gold  coins  were  quickly  exported.
Countries with a considerable circulation of silver inevitably suffered great losses. And in the end,
2 Flandreau / Holtfrerich / James, 'Introduction', p. 5. 
3 This can also be concluded from the relative attention to the Franco-German war and the
consequent arrangement of the indemnity payment in several paragraphs of Matsukata’s Report:
Matsukata Masayoshi, Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan (Tokyo, 1899) [I have
used the 2003 facsimile edition, Elibron Classics].
4 Tamaki Norio, 'Japan's Adoption of the Gold Standard and the London Money Market, 1881-
1903: Matsukata, Nakai and Takahashi', in Ian Nish, Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits Vol. I
(Richmond, Surrey, 1994), p. 124.
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the disadvantages of bimetallism outweighed its advantages.5 History, the reader is told, is the very
explanation of the latter, and is the ultimate judge of Japanese proponents of bimetallism:
'It  is easy to take bimetallists to task for their dreams. The Latin Union, to which they insisted on
returning, worked only for a very short time and produced no remarkable results. On the contrary,
Britain had been basing its prosperity on the gold monometallic standard since 1816. Its capital city,
London, was the largest market for gold, and as such other financial centres could not rank with its
status.'6
Yet, was the transition from a multiple standard pre-1873 international system to a relatively
uniform gold monometallist system really a self-explanatory course of events? According to Marc
Flandreau, it was not. The answer, he points out,  can be found in the period  preceding 1873, in
concreto in the extraordinary stability of gold-silver exchange rates between 1820 and 1870. The
latter has often been considered a riddle, in view of the existence of several standards throughout
that period. Gold and silver being commodities, their price should fluctuate —yet, exactly this was
not the case. In several studies, Flandreau indicates that the reason hereof was not, as has often been
assumed, the attempts of several central banks to provide stability, but the existence of a bimetallic
bloc.7 The argument is deceptively simple (but was hitherto unrecognized), and goes as follows. In
bimetallic regimes (i.e. regimes that have adopted a legally defined exchange rate between gold and
silver), economic agents have the choice to pay their debts in the metal of their choice, presumably
the metal that entails less costs. This triggers an increasing demand for the depreciated metal and
feeds back onto its prize, which one may expect to eventually stabilize at a level that has to be close
to the legal ratio. Formulated differently: in the pre-1873 multiple-standard international system, the
gold-silver exchange was pegged within an interval reflecting the costs associated with melting one
metal  and  minting  the  other  one  ('arbitrage').  Bimetallic  blocs,  provided  they  are  sufficiently
substantial in size,  thus function as buffers  that absorb disequilibria originating on international
bullion markets  due to,  for instance,  increased production or  discoveries  of gold and/or silver.8
Why, then, in the 1870s, countries started to shift from a multiple-standard system to a system with
5 Tamaki Norio, 'Economists in Parliament: The Fall of Bimetallism in Japan', in Sugiyama Chūhei
& Mizuta Hiroshi, Enlightenment and Beyond -Political Economy Comes to Japan (Tokyo, 1988),
pp. 224-225.
6 Tamaki Norio, 'Economists in Parliament', p. 235.
7 Marc Flandreau, L'or du monde: La France et la stabilité du système monétaire international,
1848-1873 (Paris, 2000); idem, The Glitter of Gold: France, Bimetallism, and The Emergence of
the International Gold Standard, 1848-1873 (Oxford, 2004); idem, 'The French Crime of 1873: An
Essay on the Emergence of the International Gold Standard, 1870-1880', The Journal of Economic
History, vol. 56, nr. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 862-897.
8 Marc Flandreau, 'The French Crime of 1873', pp. 866ff. 
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one international  standard,  must be explained by measuring the advantages  of  maintaining one
(gold) standard in growing international trade against the costs associated with discarding the other
metal (silver).
Clearly,  the fall  of  bimetallism may not  have  been as  preordained  as  often  asserted.  If
considered from a semantical point of view, as we shall see, history proves Flandreau's ideas right.
In 1895, almost twenty years after the 'scramble for gold'9 and two years before Japan formally
adopted the gold standard, the prolific Trumbull White published his Silver and Gold,10 a collection
of essays proving that the monometallism versus bimetallism debate continued vigorously. In Japan
too the issue was far from settled. Taguchi Ukichi 田口卯 吉 , one of Japan foremost political
economists at the time and the founding father of the Tōkyō Economist or Tōkyō keizai zasshi 東京
経済雑誌, remained a relentless defender of bimetallism (cf. infra). At least several observers at the
time did not perceive a policy path inevitably leading to the gold standard, as also Tamaki's account
testifies.11
In the following paragraphs, I will therefore take an in-depth look at Flandreau's dissection
and refutation of conventional theories, and his alternative explanation (II-III). Next, I assess the
importance of Katō Wataru's experiences in Belgium in order to consider the Japanese domestic
debate in a new light (IV-V). I will explain that Matsukata's choice for gold monometallism was
more contested that  often  surmised  (VI).  It  was part  of  a  wider  political-economic debate  and
reveals his projection of Japan's place in the late nineteenth century world order. More concretely,
it must primordially be studied as a choice for  industrialization (versus agricultural growth) and
imperialism (versus  closure)  (VII);  after  all,  monetary  standards  were  a  major  concern  when
defining which country/countries was/were to become Japan's foremost trading partner(s).
II. Flandreau's Discussion of the Emergence of the Gold Standard
Marc Flandreau discerns four different arguments on the emergence of the gold standard;
they may concur in existing analyses, yet may differ in the weight they attach to each cause:12
1. the fundamentals theory: draws attention to the importance of rising silver production in the
late 1860s and 1870s; this would have led to silver depreciation and thus forced nations to
9 Giulio Gallarotti, 'The Scramble for Gold: Monetary Regime Transformation in the 1870s'. In
Michael Bordo & Forrest Capie (eds.), Monetary Regimes in Transition (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 15-
67.
10  Trumbull White, Silver and Gold or Both Sides of the Shield: The Doctrines of Free Silver,
Mono-Metalism and Bi-Metalism (Philadelphia, 1895) (reprint 2001)
11 Tamaki Norio, 'Economists in Parliament'.
12 Marc Flandreau, 'The French Crime of 1873', p. 863ff.
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abandon that metal.
2. the  strategical  theory:  posits  that  the  economic  impact  of  rising  silver  production  was
supplemented by Germany's demonetization of silver; this reinforced the depreciation of the
metal.
3. the technological theory: stresses that silver was bulkier than gold and hence more costly for
international payments.
4. the political economy theory: argues that it was the actions of the creditors' class that favored
a stable standard of value that produced the convergence to gold in the 1870s.
The fundamentals theory has already been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, and
is, as the reader will understand, the most ancient argument for explaining convergence towards
gold monometallism. Nineteenth century observations of the process univocally refer to the fall in
the price of silver as the defining factor. As such, their legacy is enormous. It does not strike me as
inplausible that  eventually Tamaki Norio's account, for instance, has been derived directly from
Matsukata's original assessment in 1899 (which is a combination of theory 1 and 2).13 Yet, however
compelling the argument may seem, it suffers from an important analytical fallacy. If rising silver
production was indeed a major determinant, the 'scramble for gold'14 should have occurred much
earlier,  i.e.  in  the  1850s.  Then,  the  rise  in  silver  production  that  had  affected  gold  was
proportionally much larger, yet it did not trigger dramatic changes. In Flandreau's reasoning, the
bimetallic bloc had managed to wash away imbalances at the time; so why would it not have been
able to repeat this exercise twenty years later?
Defending themselves against this critique, some observers tend to mention the change in
monetary geography as a second factor. Compare for instance Matsukata's Report:
'The chief [...] causes [for the depreciation of silver] were two: the greatly increased annual output of
silver  since 1870,  and the establishment  of the German Empire.  The Government  of  the united
Germany immediately took up the scheme of unifying the coinage systems in vogue in the different
portions of the Empire, by replacing with gold coins the silver currency in use. [...] It soon began to
sell large quantities of silver, which had the effect of causing depreciation. The bimetallic countries
of Europe now saw the danger of being turned into silver countries, so that they became contrained
to adopt the lines of policy which had the tendency of making them gold standard countries.'15
13 Matsukata Masayoshi, Report, esp. pp. 145ff.
14 After: Giulio Gallarotti, ‘The Scramble for Gold: Monetary Regime Transformation in the 1870s'.
In Michael Bordo & Forrest Capie (eds.), Monetary Regimes in Transition (Cambridge, 1993), pp.
15-67.
15  Matsukata Masayoshi, Report, esp. pp. 145.
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At first sight, this sounds quite logical: Germany's decision to employ the indemnity of the Franco-
German for moving onto the gold standard brought  about a process  of positive feedback,  from
which eventually even France could not escape.  Yet, the  strategical theory too is not without its
problems. First of all, and contrary to common belief, French indemnity was not paid in specie; the
French  government  issued a perpetual  bond (the  so-called  Rente  Thiers),  to  which Franch  and
foreign investors alike subscribed, and the proceeds of which were used to obtain short-term bills
on international financial markets, which were then transferred to Germany.16 Thus, the monetary
consequences  of  the  indemnity payment  were  far  more  limited  than  is  often  surmised.17 From
Flandreau's detailed accounts,18 one understands that the indemnity issue cannot have been powerful
enough to cause the destruction of bimetallism.
Recently, two other arguments have been developed to explain the origination of the gold
standard.  Angela Redish has taken great  length to explain that technological  developments may
have played an important role. In her view, the introduction of the steam press made it possible to
produce high-quality token coins (traditionally problematic because being easily counterfeitable),
and thus paved the way for silver demonetization. However, as Redish too admits, this only refers
to the  preconditions of the gold standard,  and not to the cause for its emergence.19 Finally,  the
political  economy theory defends the viewpoint that  gold was traditionally the less deflationary
16 On the problems associated with the transfer of the indemnity, see: Michael B. Devereux and
Gregor W. Smith, 'Transfer Problem Dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian War
Indemnity'. Queen's University and University of British Columbia Working Paper (2005). 
Online: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/smithgw/transfer.pdf
In the following chapter, we will consider the importance of this point when analyzing Chinese
indemnity payments to Japan in the wake of the Sino-Japanese war.
17 Interestingly, the Iwakura Mission (so called because of being led by Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具
視), one of several official Japanese missions to foreign countries, provides  an excellent illustration
hereof: ''[T]here were claims that the wealth of Britain outstripped that of France four times over,
but the British themselves have since been astounded by the French achievement of paying off the
huge war indemnity of $950,000,000 [...] in less than two years. [...] The government may have
been impoverished, but the people themselves are rich, and daily business has carried on just as
before.Thus, the French say that the wealth of a country does not lie in filling the coffers of the
government but rests in the assets of the people. [...] Therefore, the sum of $900,000,000 (sic)
which the French government delivered to Germany they call nothing but a loan extracted from the
French people, and one which will be paid back in full within a period of seven years'. From: Kume
Kunitake, comp., Graham Healey and Chushichi Tsuzuki, eds. The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-1873:
A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation
Through the United States of America and Europe [5 vols]. (Chiba, 2002).
18 See, especially: Marc Flandreau, 'Coin Memories: Estimates of the French Metallic Currency,
1840-1878'. Journal of European Economic History 24, no. 2 (1995): pp. 271-310.
19 Angela Redish, 'The Evolution of the Gold Standard: The Case of France' (UBC Departmental
Archives 92-22 , 1992); Angela Redish, 'The Evolution of the Gold Standard in England', The
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 50, No. 4. (Dec., 1990), pp. 789-805; Angela Redish, 'The
Persistence of Bimetallism in Nineteenth-Century France ', The Economic History Review, New
Series, Vol. 48, No. 4. (Nov., 1995), pp. 717-736. 
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metal. The reason for this, as Giulio Gallarotti indicates, would be that the progold factions were
typically located in the cities, and, being capitalists (merchants, bankers, creditors etc.), they had an
interest in stability.20 Yet, this argument foregoes the fact that it was not gold yet bimetallism that
saveguarded stability. Because of its legal gold-silver exchange rate, the latter sharply reduced the
risk premium attached to lending money to nations on different standards; to international bankers,
bimetallism  furthermore  offered  constant  opportunities  for  arbitrage  (cf.  supra).  Empirical  fact
makes this clear: a large proportion of the international bankers, including the houses of Rothschild
and Bleichröder,21 were quite active in pro-bimetallism campaigns even after 1873.22 Furthermore,
and unfortunately neglected by Gallarotti, gold was considered the inflationary metal at the time:
gold overflowing the European capital markets in the wake of the Gold Rush led several economists
to advocate gold demonetization. The question of the origination of the gold standard apparently
constitutes  an  aporia.  Apparently,  existing  theories  do  not  stand  up  to  the  tests  of  empirical
verification. So what did cause the continental European powers to move away from silver in such
massive way? What was different from the situation before 1873?
III. The Alternative Explanation
Flandreau's answer to these questions marks an interesting departure from existing analyses,
and may very well  affect  our thinking about monetary standards  and regimes in a  fundamental
manner. There were no inherently monetary reasons for that process, he explains; the externalities
of political decision-making made all the difference. In order to understand this fully, one must be
aware of the climate of increasing world trade in the 1860s, and, as a corollary of this, mounting
attention to problems of foreign exchange, especially with regard to countries 1) with whom foreign
trade was substantial and 2) that at the same time were on a different monetary standard. The issue
was  especially  precarious  in  silver  standard  Germany.  Its  financiers  were  especially  concerned
about having convenient means of payment for its large imports of raw materials through or from
London. Moreover, as explained above, its exchange stability was to a large degree dependent on
the well-functioning of the arbitrage mechanism in bimetallist countries, particularly France.23 This
20  Giulio Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime : The Classical Gold
Standard, 1880-1914 (New York, 1995).
21 On the house of Rothschild, see: Niall Ferguson,  House of Rothschild : Money's Prophets: 1798-
1848 (New York, 1998); idem, The House of Rothschild: The World's Banker 1849-1998 (New
York, 2000); on Bleichröder, see: Fritz Stern, Gold und Eisen, Bismarck und sein Bankier
Bleichröder (Frankfurt am Main, 1978);  idem,  Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the
German Empire (New York, 1977).
22 Marc Flandreau, L'or du monde, esp. pp. 193 ff.
23 Marc Flandreau, 'The French Crime of 1873', p. 883.
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created the following policy dilemma. On the one hand, Germany seemed the one country that was
the least likely to convert to gold monometallism. This was the Scylla of reform feasibility. It was
not only confronted with the financial problem of finding sufficient resources for building up a gold
reserve  needed  to  initiate  the  process  of  moving  onto  the  gold  standard.  There  also  was  the
liquidation problem of being able to exchange its silver Thalers into gold once the gold standard
would have been formally adopted; and this was in no way obvious, as the very decision to move
onto the gold standard may very well have the undesirable effect of driving the price of silver down,
and thus trigger an evolution towards increasingly less attractive terms for completing the process.
Yet, on the other hand, exactly its dependency on bimetallist countries and the apparent deadlock in
which it found itself made the need for a sea change in its monetary policy so pressing —this was
the Charybdis of necessity.
The  huge  Franco-Prussian  war  indemnity  payment  of  1871-1873  changed  the  situation
radically.24 It solved at least the financial problem: five billion of French francs was more than what
was  needed  to  purchase  and  accumulate  gold  needed  to  launch  the  monetary  transition.
Furthermore,  a  crippled  France  was  believed  to  be  incapable  of  hindering  Germany's  plans  to
massively sell its silver reserves and undertaking gold coinage; indeed, early German policy moves
reveal  an extraordinary optimism with regard to the smoothness  of the transition.  Yet,  France's
reaction, whatever the original assessment of its potential outcomes had been in the heads of its
originators,25 would  prove  to  have  dramatic  and  unseen  consequences.  On  September  6  1873,
exactly one day after  the last portion of the indemnity payment had been transferred,  it  limited
silver coinage to 280,000 francs per day. The effect was immediate: the silver price fell through its
floor. Germany, which  —by the law of 1873—  had set a minimum price below which no silver
sales would take place, waited for the price to go up; the markets, on the other hand, waited for
Germany to complete its transition before they considered bidding up the silver price. As a result,
the Reichsbank was forced to abandon the original idea of selling silver and, instead, to attract gold
through discount rate increases, which in turn sent international exchange rates (mainly London)
soaring.
Making matters worse, the aforementioned 'double-bind' also re-entered as a considerable
threat to French interests. Limiting silver coinage (and thus sabotageing the mechanism of arbitrage
through which the gold-silver par  was pegged  around the legal  ratio)  had the adverse effect  of
24 On the war itself, see the locus classicus of Michael Howard: The Franco-Prussian war : the
German invasion of France, 1870-1871 (London, 1981); for a detailed analysis of the terms and
instalments of the indemnity payment, see: Arthur E. Monroe, 'The French Indemnity of 1871 and
its Effects', The Review of Economic Statistics I, 4 (October, 1919), pp. 269-281.
25 Flandreau provides evidence of French self-confidence in its capability of eventually returning to
the pre-war gold-silver par, and resuming its position as arbitrageur of last instant. See: Marc
Flandreau, 'The French Crime of 1873', p. 885.
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increasing  silver  supply,  due  to  which  the  intrinsic  value  of  French  écus dropped  below their
nominal price; clearly,  one could not have it  both ways.  Successive further limitations of silver
coinage, and its eventual complete suspension, sent strong signs to the public that France may not
be willing to play according to bimetallist  rules.  On November 19 1873, when the  Banque de
France imposed a discount rate of one-thousand on silver écus, the dam burst. Écus flowed into the
Banque and caused its silver holdings to double. By 1876, it was obvious to everybody that France,
together with fully suspending silver coinage, was also suspending its commitment to bimetallism.26
In  origin,  there  may have  been  a  domestic  motivation  behind  these  decisions.  France's
financial system, already put under considerable stress due to the indemnity payment, would have to
deal with another blow once Germany started to sell its silver reserves, and French financial policy
makers  may therefore  have  decided  to  ward  off  the  troubles  of  aggravated  sensitivity.  Yet,  as
Flandreau explains, the very decision was also undeniably founded on deeply rooted anti-German
sentiment. The indemnity had already been a considerable price. Now the French felt that Germany
could use French bimetallist  arbitrage as a ladder to climb to the gold standard,  and they were
determined to kick it away by all possible means. Nowadays, this attitude has become known as the
attitude expectante: France would not re-establish free silver coinage as long as Germany had not
completed  its  reform.27 Nationalist  antagonism and  a  striking  lack of  international  cooperation
would thus be at the origin of an unseen transformation. The French decisions, which contemporary
economists  would  only  identify  as  'irrational',  had  led  the  Continental  European  monetary
constituency into dangerous waters:
'[In 1879], France and Germany found themselves in a very analogous situation. Although they had
both stabilized their exchange rate in terms of gold, neither was fully on gold, both had a substantial
silver circulation that was still  legal tender,  neither could sell overvalued silver holdings without
making huge losses, and both needed an active commitment of their central bank to peg the value of
their silver coins.'28
Despite several international efforts to restore bimetallism,29 it appeared exceedingly unattractive.
26 Marc Flandreau, 'The French Crime of 1873', p. 888.
27 See: Marc Flandreau, 'The French Crime of 1873', p. 886.
28 See: Marc Flandreau, 'The French Crime of 1873', pp. 888-889.
29 There was a central role of the United States, an important silver producing country, in trying to
bring the Continental powers to the negotiation table and convince them of the merits of
bimetallism. They were the main supporters of the conference of 1892 in Brussels, where especially
France was demanded to restore its former role; France replied that it had been the cornerstone of
international monetary stability for decades, and that it thus had done enough efforts —such
renewed role should not be expected. See: Alfred De Foville, 'A History of the Latin Union' [review
of: Henry Parker Willis, A History of the Latin Monetary Union (Chicago, 1901)], The Journal of
Political Economy 10, 1 (December, 1901), p. 118; Henry Parker Willis, A History of the Latin
9
As an ironical twist of fate, the first era of the gold standard would in the first half of the twentieth
century come to be remembered as an example of nineteenth century liberalism and international
cooperation...
IV. The Latin Monetary Union and Belgium's Predicament
Obviously, French monetary policy was closely watched by the other members of the Latin
Monetary Union. This was especially true for Belgium, not only because it was so close to France,
but also because its monetary situation at the time and before can only be described as peculiar. Put
bluntly,  it  was de facto a  monetary satellite of France.30 After  declaring its  independence from
Holland in 1831, it had abolished the old Dutch currency and adopted the French monetary system
in its entirety. By dint of its  currency legislation (1832),  closely resembling the French law 1803,
Belgium had adopted the franc as its currency unit, and even allowed French gold and silver pieces
as legal tender in Belgium. The same legislation also stipulated the minting of Belgian gold and
silver coins, yet its operation resulted in a mere silver circulation, just as in France. As a matter of
fact, Belgium did not mint one gold coin for 15 years.31 In the same period, Dutch 10-florin gold
coins remained legal tender by weight. After this most disorderly first period, the Belgian Chambers
introduced legislation with the objective of introducing a gold currency. It put a premium of 1.1 %
on the English sovereign, and was apparently helped by the Dutch decision to demonetize gold
(1847) and the French move to mint extra quantities of gold coin (which were equally given legal
tender quality). This second period ended abruptly. After depriving legal tender quality of English,
French and Dutch coins in resp. 1849 and 1850, Belgium also demonetized its indigenously struck
gold  currency  in  accordance  with  the  international  tendency.  It  finally  appeared  to  be  able  to
appease its monetary situation. 
Nothing, however,  was less true. Sharp differences in the quality of French and Belgian
silver coin stock, and the perverse effect of French arbitrage resulted in the inflow of increasingly
worn silver  coin,  while  it  was unprofitable for  Belgium, now on a silver  standard,  to continue
minting silver.32 In a later instant, the gradual disappearing of even the abraded coins and several
Monetary Union (Chicago, 1901), esp. pp. 236ff.. 
30 For a short and authoritative overview, see: H. Parker Willis, Belgian Monetary Legislation, The
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 2. (March 1895), pp. 222-232; Henry Parker Willis, A
History of the Latin Monetary Union (Chicago, 1901), esp. pp. 15-25; this discussion is also taken
up in:  C.A. Conant, The National Bank Of Belgium (Washington, 1910), pp. 163-179.
31 For an overview of amounts of coins minted in the countries of the Latin Monetary Union, see:
Henry Parker Willis, A History of the Latin Monetary Union (Chicago, 1901), esp. pp. 87ff.
32 H. Parker Willis, 'Belgian Monetary Legislation', p. 207-208; on the financial-technological
intricacies of arbitrage, cf. supra. 
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flawed policies (e.g. the decision to declare French gold coins once more as legal tender and thus to
bring  Belgium upon an  alternating  standard)  only  exacarbated  matters.  Belgium's  geographical
location may also have been an unfortunate factor in this respect. In the heart of Europe, practically
at the crossing of the great Continental European metallic blocs, and lacking the vastness of French
gold and silver holdings, it was almost destined to become the victim of arbitrage and speculation.
The  fastidious  influences  of  monetary  matters  on  Belgian  commerce  prompted  the  Belgian
government  in  1865 to  call  for  the establishment  of  the Latin  Monetary Union.  Originally,  its
outlook was promising. Apparently, Belgium would be able to reap only the benefits of allying with
what was beyond doubt the pivotal agent in Europe's monetary constituency.33
Yet, in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war indemnity payment, Belgium's status of being
bound to the fate of a union overwhelmingly dominated by one nation once more created serious
problems. As Alfred De Foville, once director of the French Mint, would much later exclaim, '[t]he
convention of 1865 has been compared to a marriage contract; that of 1885 has somewhat the form
of a will'.34 In fact, those stipulations that made the Union's unity (esp. the provision that each of the
contracting governments agreed to receive freely at their public offices the money coined by the
other three states) were later neglected by France, much against the spirit of the Union; French  self-
interest and political unwill became the dagger aimed at Belgian monetary and financial sanity.
The main problem was that the convention of 1865 did not touch the question of the legal
tender  quality  and  the free  coinage  of  silver  5-franc pieces.  This  was alright  as  long as  silver
remained undervalued at the coinage ratio  —i.e. as long as it remained profitable to coin silver
pieces. But once the course reversed, when gold appreciated and silver fell below its legal value at
the coinage ratio (as was clearly the case in 1873), the only solution would have been to follow the
French lead, and immediately suspend the coinage of 5-franc silver pieces. In that respect, Belgium
seriously failed. Under minister of finance Jules Malou, the extended coinage of the silver coins had
risen to the dramatic proportions of 111,704,795 francs; and even after 1873, Malou was seduced
into coining yet  another 37,704,130  francs at the advantage of the Belgian treasury,  which were
later converted into serious losses.35 As no indigenous commercial use for the excessive coinage
could be found, Belgian coins at first flooded into France (which, as we know, had been a problem
already before the establishment of the Union); but once the latter put strict limitations on its silver
coinage, Belgium had to pay the full price for its uncontrolled monetary offspring. It was then that it
would learn of the great  disadvantages of being the underdog in an alliance.  Years later,  at the
conference in 1885, France pressed for a provision stipulating that the other Union members were
33 P. Kauch, De Nationale Bank Van België, 1850-1918 (Brussels, 1950), pp. 150ff.
34 Alfred De Foville, 'A History of the Latin Union', pp. 113-119. 
35 C.A. Conant, The National Bank Of Belgium (Washington, 1910), p. 170; P. Kauch, De
Nationale Bank Van België, 1850-1918 (Brussels, 1950), pp. 212-218.
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responsible for redeeming the excess of 5-franc pieces they had coined and which circulated in
France; the redeemed amount would have to be paid to France in gold.
If it had been effectuated, such clause would have been an enormous burden for the Union
members,  especially for  Belgium.  However,  Walthère Frère-Orban,  as  so many times ahead of
events, anticipated that the fall in the silver price was far from having reached its end and therefore
advocated the immediate liquidation of the silver coins according to the French demand. The longer
such action would be postponed, he reasoned, the more onerous the price would be. Already in
1873, he had therefore also urged for the convocation of the Union, and for Belgian action to move
onto the gold standard. As history has it, his proposals were not taken seriously. Instead, in 1885,
Belgium chose to withdraw from the conference, only to return later and negotiate a compromise
agreement,36 as matters grew worse.  By then, however, the tide could not be reversed.37 Now on the
gold standard, Belgian policy makers reckoned that it would be impossible to absorb the enormous
amount of 300,000,000 francs circulating in France, and therefore chose not to dissolve the Latin
Monetary Union (which would officially be disbanded in 1927). Yet, the conference of 1878 de
facto meant the funeral of bimetallism and the tragic end of Europe's first experiment with monetary
unification. These were the circumstances of which Katō Wataru must have learnt when staying in
Belgium.
V. Matsukata Masayoshi and the Reconstruction of the European Experience
How  can  we  assess  the  impact  of  Matsukata's  and  Katō's  learning  of  the  Continental
European Question Monétaire on the Japanese debate on metallic standards in the aftermath of the
Sino-Japanese  War?  At  first  sight,  such  link  seems  rather  implausible.  Belgian  and  Japanese
monetary developments represent very different types of policy preoccupations, and are furthermore
separated by very different temporal, political and even geographical factors. Whatever Matsukata
and  Katō  may have concluded from the Belgian  experience  during their  respective  stays,  their
36 See: C.A. Conant, The National Bank Of Belgium (Washington, 1910), pp. 171-177.
37 Compare: 'If the counsel of M.  Frère-Orban in 1885 had been followed, Belgium might have
reorganized her monetary system upon a basis independent of that of France at a much smaller cost
than a few years later. [...] At the average price [of silver in] 1885 the loss would have been about
20 per cent of the face value of the coins. At the average price for the year ending June 30, 1908 [...]
the depreciation was nearly 60 per cent below legal parity. [...] A policy of waiting has several
compensations. The growth in population and in the economic resources of the country tends to
increase the demand for currency, while the lapse of time increases the extent of the slow
disappearance and absorption of the excess coins. [...] In monetary matters time is usually a cure for
evils whose sources have been suppressed'. C.A. Conant, The National Bank Of Belgium
(Washington, 1910), pp. 177-179.
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conclusions were unlikely to have retained their relevance twenty years later, in the context of the
Japanese  victory over  China.  Furthermore,  the frequent  changes of  leadership,  including in the
fields of monetary and financial policy making, and the frequent and documented cases of dissensus
and political rivalry cast further doubt as to substantive continuities. And yet, abundant references
to monetary and political happenings on the European Continent in the writings of various Japanese
monetary policy makers reveal  an extraordinary attention to the function of foreign learning in
matters of decision-making. The references to world happenings, and the role and domestic political
dynamics of especially the European powers in for instance Matsukata's reports and treatises, the
works of Maeda Masana 前田正名, and the diary of Takahashi Korekiyo 高橋是清 are undeniable;
they hint to the existence of strong connective threads, if only with regard to ideological emulation
and experiment. How is this to be reckoned with?
As the reader will remember from the introductory methodological  chapter,  learning and
memory need not be conceptualized in terms of continuity or linearity  —this would only cause a
system  to  be  overburdened  by  its  experiences.  Instead,  I  argued  that  adaptation,  growth,  and
evolution  are  made  possible  only  through  dealing  selectively  with  those  experiences.
Conceptualized as a mechanism in the present of systemic (i.e. political, financial etc.)  practice,
memory  provides  a  ground  for  redefining,  renegotiating,  and  (re)constructing 'what  has  been
learnt'. In other words, memory and learning do not simply react to the historical realities to which
they refer,  but stand for the way in which systems self-referentially process the  images of their
experiences of those realities, how they interpret them and/or forget them; in still other words, they
are the expression of the fact that systems create (selective) histories in order to select possible
futures, and only thus to make sense of their present. 
Recent literature on imperialism reinforces this view, as I also indicated in the introductory
chapter. Critical of the Mannheimian view of imperialism as a clearly circumscribed path of action
determined by a rationally defined set of strategical objectives and well-considered tactical means
geared towards the envisaged gains, historians as David Landes, Daniel Headrick and Yoshihisa
Matsusaka have arrived at the idea that imperialist conquest is rather  adaptive or  opportunistic.38
Objectives, they say, are seldom determined at the outset, but are prone to change, shrink or expand
in the course of conquest. The formulation of policy commonly proceeds through rationalization
38 David S. Landes, 'Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism', The Journal of
Economic History, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Dec., 1961), pp. 496-512; Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of
Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 (New York / Oxford, 1988);
idem, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperalism in the Nineteenth Century (New
York / Oxford, 1981); idem, 'The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of European
Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century' The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, No. 2, (issue:
Technology and War) (Jun., 1979), pp. 231-263; Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of
Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932 (Cambridge / London, 2001).
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after the fact of acquisition,39 as statesmen and policy makers do not possess clear information of
the territories gained and/or resources acquired. Regularly shifting domestic policy coalitions and
the volatile issues of public opinion contribute to imperialist appetite either through limiting (e.g. in
the public's fear of huge military losses) or feeding (as e.g. in the case of 1930's Japanese 'culture of
empire') the latter.40 So do the rise and decline of private enterprises with an imperialist interest, the
mechanisms of army-navy factionalism; and not to forget the peculiar and autonomous dynamics of
the  semantics  of  'modernization'  and  'civilization'.41 It  is  obviously  no  mistake  to  extend  these
insights to the realities of policy-making as a whole. Constrained by limited information flows,
decision-making deadlines, coalition politics and so on, policy-makers necessarily orient themselves
to short-term objectives, while their decisions and ever changing environmental factors (including
public opinion) recreate the context in which further decisions can and have to be taken.42
One crucially important yet often neglected agent of change is  technology, especially with
regard to its potential to recast the horizons of what is possible and/or desirable. Daniel Headrick
argued with reason that 'the appearance of a new technology can reinforce or trigger a motive by
making  the  desired  end  possible  or  acceptably  cheap'.43 Apparently,  technology  should  not  be
dismissed as a neutral factor, although its potential can only be brought to action if policies and
policy makers pay sufficient  attention to it  and are willing to accommodate its  consequences.44
Matsusaka demonstrated that  such interaction of technological  and psychological  factors  was at
work in the development of Japanese imperialist enterprise in Manchuria:
'Technological  innovations could lead to new ways of exploiting territorial resources, just as the
development of the railway, telegraph, and shallow-draft steamer in the first half of the nineteenth
century had created the basic framework of opportunity for the grand grand expansionism of the
second.  [...]  [In  Japanese  Manchuria],  the  railway  would  seem  particularly  important  as  a
39 Obviously, Matsukata's Report is exemplary hereof. 
40 Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism
(Berkeley, 1998).
41 On the argument of 'civilizing' Manchuria as a motivation of Japanese imperialism, compare:
Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, pp. 49ff.
42 For a good example on how domestic politics interacted with defining Japanese economic and
financial position in the world economy of the late nineteenth century, see: Iokibe Kaoru 五百旗頭
薫,  『大隈重信と政党政治―複数政党制の起源 明治十四年‐大正三年』 Ōkuma Shigenobu to
seitō seiji — fukusōseitōsei no kigen meiji 14 nen- taishō 3 nen (Ōkuma Shigenobu and party
politics — the birth of the multiple party system, meiji 14 – taishō 3) (Tokyo, 2003).
43 Daniel Headrick, 'The Tools of Imperialism', p. 234; compare furthermore:  Clarence B. Davis /
Kenneth E. Wilburn, Jr. / Ronald E. Robinson, Railway Imperialism (Westport, Conn., 1991).
44 For an argument in favor of such 'optative' view of historiography, see David S. Landes, 'What
Room for Accident in History?: Explaining Big Changes by Small Events', The Economic History
Review, New Series, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 637-656; idem, 'Some Further Thoughts on
Accident in History: A Reply to Professor Crafts', The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol.
48, No. 3. (Aug., 1995), pp. 599-601. 
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technological source of opportunity, [...] also in the more specific context of formulating a course of
action  in  Manchuria.  The  versatility  of  the  railway  as  an  instrument  of  war,  of  economic
development, and of territorial integration allowed for a wide range of imperial policy goals, from
the modestly commercial to the more ambitiously colonial.'45
Imperialism thus appears as an extremely dynamic and open-ended process, in which the role of the
political  system46 is  about  attempting  to  coordinate  all  motivations  and  interests,  and  —quite
literally— reinventing imperial policy over time, while trying to keep up pace with the mercurial
nature of opportunity itself.
VI. The Monetary Commission 貨幣制度調査会
Is one justified to draw similar conclusions about the impact of  financial or, in this case,
monetary  technology?  Matsukata  Masayoshi  was,  beyond  doubt,  one  of  the  major  nineteenth
century Japanese masters of opportunity. At the time of the Chinese war indemnity transfer, he felt
the time had come for the execution of a master plan he had probably been pondering since the
beginning of his career as minister of finance and which, according to Takahashi Korekiyo, directly
derived from his learning of the Franco-Prussian war indemnity payment.47 Ironically, opportunity
was not so much provided by his own actions, but by then minister of finance Watanabe Kunitake
渡辺国武 in 1893. Fearing that Japanese adherence to the silver standard would not be in the
Japanese economic interest, he intended to establish a 'Coinage Investigation Commission' (kahei
seido chōsakai 貨幣制度調査会). On October 14 1893, the Japanese government promulgated the
Commission's regulations.48 According to these regulations the commission was appointed, and the
first thing it did was appointing a special sub-committee which did several preliminary researches;
these were reported to the commission, which consulted several times on the basis of these research
results.
The commission was, as we know, composed of twenty-two members.49 The questions the
45 Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, pp. 12-13.
46 For the sake of the argument, I omit at this point references to the role of economics, education,
culture etc. 
47 Takahashi Korekiyo, p. 58; mentioned as well in: Metzler, Lever of Empire, p. 31.
48  Matsukata Masayoshi, Report, pp. 160-161.
49 The chairman was Viscount Tani Kanjō 谷干城; the deputy chairman was Tajiri Inajirō 田尻稲
次郎, then secretary to the minister of finance; one official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
one of the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture; two officials from the Ministry of Finance; the
governor of the Bank of Japan; the governor of the Yokohama Specie Bank; the governor of the
First National Bank; the presidents of the Mitsui Trading Company and the Mitsubishi Corporation;
two professors of the Imperial University of Tokyo, the president of Keiō University, and one
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commission was to deliberate were the following:
1. What were the causes and results of the recent fluctuations in gold and silver?
2. What were the influences thereof on the Japanese economy?
3. Which metallic standard should be adopted: gold, silver, or the bimetallic standard?
The commission submitted its report in July 1896.50 With regard to the first question, its members
had been unanimous.  [...]  And with regard  to question two,  they more or  less agreed  that  any
advantages associated with the low silver prize would only be felt in the short term. Indeed, cheap
silver had resulted in a large increase of Japanese exports,51 but the committee judged the inversely
proportional decrease of Japanese purchasing power (rightfully) as a threat to Japanese commerce
and industry. But there was much less agreement on how to cope with these challenges. After all,
the costs associated with moving onto a different standard may outdo any comparative advantage
towards  China  and  Korea;  one  should  proceed  with  caution,  the  argument  went.  And yet,  the
commission projected a shift of the government's attitude towards monetary matters 'in the future',
but it conspicuously omitted reference to any specific date.
As  indicated  by  Tamaki,  this  rather  ambiguous  guideline  was  crucially  colored  by  the
professor from the Tokyo School of Special Studies (now Waseda University), two senators, four
members of the Diet, and one jornalist. See as well: Tamaki Norio, 'Economists in Parliament: The
Fall of Bimetallism in Japan', in Sugiyama Chūhei & Mizuta Hiroshi, Enlightenment and Beyond
-Political Economy Comes to Japan (Tokyo, 1988), p. 231.
50 For the full report, see: 「貨幣制度調査会報告」, in 大内兵衛・土屋喬雄編 (eds.) 『明治前期財
政経済史料集成』 Vol. 12 (Tokyo, 1932 ), p. 202-23
51 This was also realized by foreign commentators at the time. Compare: 
'Le Japon, en abandonnant l'étalon d'argent pour l'étalon d'or, va-t-il perdre le bénéfice de
cette situation dans ses rapport commerciaux avec l'Europe et les Etats-Unis? Y-renonce-t-il
de gaité de cœur, dans le seul but de se mettre, en matière de monnaie comme en tout en
autre, a l'unisson des grandes nations occidentales? Ce serait bien singulier, et nous pouvons
présumer, avant tout examen de la question, que les hommes d'Etat de ce pays sont trop
avisés pour avoir sacrifié un avantage certain, considéré par les Japonais eux-mêmes comme
une des causes principales de leur prospérité, pour la vaine satisfaction d'avoir la même
monnaie que les peuples qui détiennent l'hégémonie commerciale.'
[Will Japan, when abandoning the silver standard for the gold standard, lose the benefits of this
[former] situation in its commercial contacts with Europe and the United States? Will it do all this
effort to put itself on the same rank with the Great Western Powers, in monetary terms as well as in
other matters? That would be extraordinary indeed, and we may assume, before even inquiring into
the matter, and if only considering that the Japanese themselves have been one of the main causes
of their prosperity, that the statesmen of this country are too well informed to sacrifice a sure
advantage for the vain satisfaction of possessing the same money as those peoples enjoying
commercial hegemony.] M. Bourguin, 'L'Etalon d'or au Japon [the gold standard in Japan], Revue
d'économie politique XI (1897), [pp. 703-725 (part I); pp. 816-848 (part II); pp. 899-916 (part III)],
p. 836.
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findings of the special committee, and especially by Matsukata's shrewd and careful manipulation
of the latter (cf. infra).52 This special committee was actually a select group of monetary specialists
and academics: Sonoda Kōkichi 園田孝吉 , chairman and then governor of the Yokohama Specie
Bank, Sakatani Yoshio 阪谷芳郎, an ex-student of Tokyo university, an extremely able official, and
Matsukata's right-hand man;53 Soeda Juichi  添田寿一 , who is responsible for a whole range of
publications on Japanese financial issues in English;54 Kanai Noboru 金井延, professor of political
economy of Tokyo University;and Taguchi Ukichi  田口卯吉 , as said the founding father of the
Tokyo Political Economy Club (cf. supra). Later, its ranks were expanded to include Watanabe Kōki
渡辺洪基 , Diet member and former president of the Imperial University of Tokyo and Masuda
Takashi 益田孝, president of the Mitsui Trading Company.
Exactly at the time when  the committee struggled with its reports (1894-1895), the war with
China broke out, and was eventually brought to successful conclusion for Japan. In May 1895, the
special committee formulated its findings, but, as already said in the introduction to this chapter, the
opinions of the committee's members tended to differ drastically. As could be expected, Sakatani,
Soeda and Watanabe favored the gold standard; yet, Taguchi and Kanai argued for bimetallism;55
Sonoda,  the most  senior  member preferred the status  quo (i.e.  silver);  Masuda did not  commit
himself either way. As a result of this contention, no member, except for the outspoken and radical
gold monometallist Sakatani, was a proponent of any immediate change.
This  outcome  clearly  did  not  please  Matsukata,  who  immediately  tried  to  force  a  way
forward. Consultations with Sonoda, a fellow Satsuma man, broke the stalemate. At the general
meeting of the Commission in June 1895, Sonoda demanded a vote to decide whether a change in
monetary policy should be needed in the near future. The objective was clear: Matsukata wanted to
have the moderate gold monometallists and the few bimetallists in the Commission align with the
radical Sakatani and as such outnumber the defendants of the status quo. It proved a well calculated
move. The  Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan politely mentions:
52  Tamaki Norio, 'Economists in Parliament', pp. 231 ff.
53 On Sakatani, see as well: anon., 『 阪谷芳郎傳』 sakatani yoshio den (a biography of Sakatani
Yoshio) (Tokyo, 1951).
54 Soeda's publications in this respect: A History of Banking in Japan (Surrey, 1996) [this is a
facsimile of the original 1896 edition, Volume IV of A History of Banking in all the leading
Nations) 'Letter from Japan', The Economic Journal, Vol. 14, No. 55. (Sep., 1904), pp. 473-479;
'Japanese Finance', The Economic Journal, Vol. 20, No. 77. (Mar., 1910), pp. 122-128; 
55 Taguchi's ideas were, in fact, quite advanced in this respect. As explained by Tamaki, he had
probably been strongly influenced by the American economist Francis Amasa Walker, one of the
first presidents of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), president of the American
Statistical Association (ASA) and the first president of the American Economic Association (AEA).
He was the son of Amasa Walker, who had played an important role in the bullionist controversy;
Francis Walker was a proponent of bimetallism. See, for instance: 'Shall Silver Be Demonetized',
The North American review, Vol. 140, Issue 343 (1885): pp. 489-492. 
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'[E]ight members voted for the resolution advocating the need of making changes, while seven voted
for maintaining the present system unchanged. Among those who advocated the necessity of making
changes, six adocated the adoption of the gold standard while two advocated a bi-metallic system.
Thus the majority of the commission were of opinion that there was a necessity of making changes
in the present coinage system of the country, and the majority again of those who advocated the need
of making changes were in favour of adopting the gold standard. It was thus clearly shown that the
coinage reform and the adoption of a gold standard was the pressing necessity of the time.'56
 
VII. 'Entering the West'
Yet,  what  was  the  opportunity  Matsukata  created  when  bringing  Japan  upon  the  gold
standard? According to Mark Metzler, it must be discussed as part of the grander semantical scheme
of 'leaving Asia and entering the West'  ( 脱 亜 入 欧  datsua nyūō).57 The slogan stems from an
influential and famous editorial in Jiji Shinpō (時事新報), written by Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉
in 1885.58 To associate with neighboring China and Korea, he explained, would invite Westerners to
view Japan as backward and Asian: 'The person who is close to bad friends cannot avoid getting a
bad name.'59  Fukuzawa’s slogan became well known, and it served to encapsulate a whole set of
systemic changes. First of all, it induced a sharp ideological shift.60 Impressed by the superiority of
Western weaponry, organization, policy makers figured that it would be wise to join the Western
ranks, as the Japanese would not be able to beat  them at their game. Japanese political classes,
opinion makers, teachers etc. therefore engaged in ideological programs explaining the benefits of
Western values and beliefs.  At several  instants,  I  have referred to the role of slogans aimed at
mobilizing  the  Japanese  populace.  The  central  tenet  is  wellknown:  only  if  Japan  would  be
economically and militarily strong, if it would emerge as the 'Great-Britain' of the East, the Western
powers would respect its territorial integrity and political-economic ambitions.
Second, and clearly closely related to the former, it was a fertile ground for a wave of efforts
56 Matsukata,  Report, p. 165.
57 Metzler, Lever of Empire, p.  29-44.
58 Fukuzawa 3/16/1885, in Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū vol. 10, pp. 238–240
59 In the original: 「惡友ヲ親シム者ハ共ニ惡友ヲ免カル可ラズ。我ハ心ニ於テ亞細亞東方ノ惡友
ヲ謝絶スルモノナリ」. A full-text version of the 'datsua-theory' or datsua-ron (脱亜論) can be found
online:
http://www.jca.apc.org/kyoukasyo_saiban/datua2.html
60 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths; Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, NJ, 1985);
Jean-Jacques Tschudin & Claude Hamon, La Nation en Marche –Etudes sur le Japon impérial de
Meiji (Paris, 1999). Ian Buruma, Inventing Japan, 1868-1964 (New York, 2003); 
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to  emulate  Western  institutions  and  their  institutional  practices.61 Virtually  no  societal  domain
(politics, education, the law...) was unaffected by this experiment. In chapter 3, I have explained
how and why Japanese financial policy makers to Belgian financial organization when establishing
a modern network of banks, characterized by the versatility of activities and responsibilities in the
various areas of the credit system (cf.  supra). Numerous other studies have analyzed the role of
foreign employees, Japanese missions abroad, and the acquisition of foreign institutional models for
the rise of 'Western-style' institutions in early modern Japan.62 Monetarily too, Japan was ready to
join the West. By moving onto the gold standard, Japan showed the aspiration to be a recognized as
a monetarily and financially prudent member of the select 'gold club' of countries dominating the
international political and economic scene, and auctioning for the vast territories yet unseen to the
imperialist powers. In that respect, the gold standard  served as a 'guarantee of financial rectitude'.63
As  argued  by  Michael  Bordo  and  Hugh  Rockoff,  several  nations,  more  or  less  at  the
periphery  of  the  international  system,  preferred  close,  if  sometimes  costly,64 adherence  to  gold
standard  rules,  as  it  provided  access  to  Western  capital  that  was  crucial  to  their  development:
'faithful  adherence significantly reduced the cost of loans from metropolitan Europe'.65  Moving
onto the  gold  standard  and  maintaining it  meant  avoiding the risks  associated  with gold/silver
exchange rates, and, especially, the disadvantages of clinging to the increasingly inattractive silver
monometallism at the end of the nineteenth century.  In the  Report on the Adoption of the Gold
Standard in Japan, Matsukata (in the person of Soeda Juichi) therefore states: 
'Since now [that Japan has adopted the gold standard] the capitalists of the gold standard countries
61 Eleanor D. Westney, Imitation and Innovation ―The Transfer of Western Organizational
Patterns in Meiji Japan (Cambridge and London , 1987); Hazel J. Jones, Live Machines: Hired
Foreigners and Meiji Japan (Tenterden, 1980).
62 With a focus on financial and monetary institutions: Yoshino Toshihiko, 'The Creation of the
Bank of Japan —Its Western Origin and Adaptation', Developing Economies 15 (December 1977),
381-401; Roy S. Hanashiro, Thomas William Kinder & the Japanese Imperial Mint, 1868-1875
(Leiden-Boston-Köln, 1999); Miyajima Shigeki and Warren E. Weber, 'A Comparison of National
Banks in Japan and the United States between 1872 and 1885', Monetary and Economic Studies
(2001). Online: http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/publication/mes/2001/me19-1-2.pdf; Katalin
Ferber, '“Run the State Like a Business”: the Origin of the Deposit Fund in Meiji Japan'. Japanese
Studies vol 22, no.2 (September 2002).
63 Michael D. Bordo; Hugh Rockoff, 'The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval"', The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 56, No. 2, [Papers Presented at the Fifty-Fifth
Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association]. (Jun., 1996), pp. 389-428; on the role of the
gold standard as a symbol of modernity, see as well: Giulio M. Gallarotti, The Anatomy of an
International Monetary Regime -The Classical Gold Standard, 1880 - 1914 (New York/Oxford,
1995). pp. 143 ff.
64 This is stressed as well by Bourguin in his evaluation of Japan's adoption of the gold standard (cf.
supra); M. Bourguin, 'L'Etalon d'or au Japon'. Revue d'économie politique XI (1897). pp. 703-725
(part I); pp. 816-848 (part II); pp. 899-916 (part III); p. 836.
65 Michael D. Bordo; Hugh Rockoff, 'The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal”', p. 390.
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have become assured that they will no longer be in constant danger of suffering unexpected losses
from investments made in this country, on account of fluctuations in the price of silver, they seem to
show a growing tendency to  make  such  investments  at  low rates  of  interest.  This  tendency,  if
encouraged, will  doubtless  bring about a closer  connection between this country and the central
money markets of the world.'66
In other words, for Japan (as for other peripheral countries), the gold standard was desirable chiefly
because it  opened access to the European capital markets  —a quite  tangible effect  of monetary
policy indeed! Later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, this would also make it considerably
easier to raise loans on the London capital market when Japan was preparing to go to war with
Russia.67 And imports from Western countries were obviously less risky, too.
This brings us to a point that has unfortunately been neglected by analyses of the role of the
gold standard in the process of modernization.68 What did the above 'closer connection between this
country and the central money markets of the world' concretely mean? Although Matsukata did not
identify as such in the Report, it relates to especially those sectors of the economy that would be at
once an instrument and an agent in the development and formulation of Japanese imperialism.69
66 Matsukata Masayoshi, Report, p. xii.
67 On the business of Japanese loans, see: Suzuki Toshio, Japanese Government Loan Issues on the
London Capital Market 1870-1913 (London / Atlantic Highlands, 1994); on the importance of
foreign capital in consolidating the Japanese state and its imperialist ventures, see convincingly:
Simon Bytheway, 日本経済と外国資本 nihon keizai to gaikoku shihon, 1858-1939 (the Japanese
economy and foreign capital, 1858-1939) (Tokyo, 2005).
68 The debate concerns the question whether the gold standard or rather mere sound financial
practice (especially the debt burden) mattered to international financial markets for determining
market access. Authors arguing for the importance of the choice of exchange rate regime (the gold
standard): Bordo / Rockoff, 'The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal”'; Nathan Sussman
and Yishay Yafeh. 'Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government
Debt in the Meiji Era.' Journal of Economic History 60 (June 2000): pp. 442-67; Maurice Obstfeld
and Alan M. Taylor, 'Sovereign Risk, Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-
31.' Economic Journal (April 2003): 241-75. For a compelling argument gainst the importance of
exchange rate regimes: Marc Flandreau and Fréderic Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880-
1913 (Paris, 2004). For an overview of the debate: Hugh Rockoff, 'Review of Marc Flandreau and
Frederic Zumer The Making of Global Finance, 1880-1913' Economic History Services, Feb 1,
2005, URL : http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/0895.shtml . Interestingly, my analysis reveals that
both viewpoints need not be taken as antagonistic as often presented: exchange rate regimes did not
matter per se, but —at least in the Japanese case— came to bear on the issue of (technology)
imports, in turn associated with political economic preferences of industrial growth and, in the end,
choices of political development.
69 Matsukata thus once more endorses his position in an earlier debate about the direction of
Japanese economic growth. Maeda Masana's 「工業意見」 kōgyō iken (on manufacturing) had
argued for the establishment of a bank concerned with the development of Japan's agriculture;
Matsukata, a convinved industrialist had passages on agricultural growth removed, and would
eventually put an end to Maeda's political career as well. For an overview of the debate, see:
Sydney Crawcour, 'Kogyo Iken: Maeda Masana and His View of Meiji Economic Development',
Journal of Japanese Studies 23:1 (1997), pp. 69-104. 
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After all, its commitment to become a member of the modern world society of the late nineteenth
century implied a thorough absorption of Western technologies to be appropriated (and eventually
'indigenized' (kokusanka 国産化)70),  but which were not available or known to the Japanese at the
time of their decision to be part of the West —they would have to be imported at a serious price.71
Railroad technology, later at the core of strategy and tactics in the occupation of Manchuria, was
first zealously imported from Great-Britain.72 But much more important items of expenditure were
the army and the navy, and especially costs associated with naval technology.73 Not accidentally,
Matsukata had already urged then Minister of War Ōyama Iwao  大山巌 in 1887 to use caution
when ordering munitions from Western countries, because of the ever declining value of silver.74
In  acquiring  a  modern  army  and  navy,  the  role  of  gold  standard  Great-Britain  was
particularly important. Ever since the fall of the bakufu, Japan's dependence on, for instance, British
70 Or, in the parlance of the time, they would be used as part of the strategy of 'weapons
independence' (gunki dokuritsu 軍器独立). Mentioned in: Nagura Bunji 奈倉 文二 / Yokoi
Katsuhiko 横井 勝彦 / Onozuka Tomoji 小野塚, 知二, 『日英兵器産業とジーメンス事件』 nichi-ei
heiki sangyō to ji-mensu jiken (Anglo-Japanese arms production and the Siemens-incident) (Tokyo,
2003). p. 4ff. On kokusanka and the formidable role of Japanese 'technonationalism' (the ideology
stressing the beneficial aspects of all technology, be it military or civilian, for growth and
modernization), see: Richard Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”; National Security and the
Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca and London, 1994).
71 Therefore, throughout the period of maintaining a silver standard,
'la cherté des produits européens et américains, aggravée au Japon par la baisse du change,
ne peut empêcher que les Japonais s'adresser aux pays à étalon d'or pour se procurer les
marchandises nécessaires au développement de leur industrie, car ils ne peuvent les trouver
chez eux'.
(the high price of European and American products, exacerbated by the deterioration of , cannot
withhold the Japanese from turning to the countries on the gold standard for buying those products
necessary for the development of their industry, as they cannot find [those products] domestically)
See: M. Bourguin, 'L'Etalon d'or au Japon', p. 825ff.
72 Steven J. Ericson, 'Importing Locomotives in Meiji Japan: International Business and Technology
Transfer in the Railroad Industry', Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 13, special issue: “Beyond Joseph
Needham: Science, Technology, and Medicine in East and Southeast Asia”. (1998), pp. 129-153.
73 Yamamura Kozo's account is particularly fascinating: Kozo Yamamura, 'Success Illgotten? The
Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan's Technological Progress', Journal of Economic History, Vol. 37,
No. 1 (special issue: The Tasks of Economic History) (March, 1977), pp. 113-135. See, for an
English account of Japanese arms production and its effect on the Japanese economy: Kobayashi
Uchisaburo, Military Industries of Japan (New York, 1922). For the role of war and armament
expenditures in the Japanese economy and gross national product: Ono Giichi, War and Armament
Expenditures of Japan (Oxford, 1922). Ono estimates the share of armament expenditures in total
state expenditures for the period from 1894 (the outbreak of the Sino Japanese War) until 1913 as
constantly around 30%, with record shares of 50% and more (!) in the period immediately after
1896. See: Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures, pp. 302-303.
74 Matsukata Masayoshi, Tokyo Keizai zasshi 東京経済雑誌 1887, May 7; also mentioned in:
Norio Tamaki,  Japanese Banking: A History, 1859-1959 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 83; idem, Tamaki
Norio, 'Economists in Parliament', p. 229. 
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naval  technology  was  substantial,  both  for  acquiring  state-of-the-art  equipment  through  direct
imports  as  for  enhancing  Japan's  technology  knowledge  base,  i.e.  through  experimenting  with
production  modes,  maintenance  and  so  on  —these  mechanisms  always  went  hand  in  hand.75
Important for our discussion, Matsukata's remarks were formulated slightly before the period when
preparations for the Sino-Japanese War, and later the Russo-Japanese War resulted into sharply
rising budgets for military build-up and readiness;  domestic production was unable to meet the
large demand, so even more reliance had to be placed on imported steel and military technology.76
In the same period, furthermore, Japanese dependence on British arms producers was particularly
substantial.  Although  Japanese  shipbuilders  had  been  able  to  more  or  less  dominate  naval
production around 1880, the advent of the steamship as the symbol of modern navy and as the
engine  behind the development  of a wholly new kind of  strategies  and battles  forced Japanese
military policy once more into what they deemed to be an undesirable large-scale reliance on and
collaboration  with  major  English  civilian  arms  producers  as  Vickers,  Armstrong,  and  Nobel.
According  to  Nagura,  Yokoi  and  Onozuka,77 the  share  of  British  makers  in  the  production  of
Japanese  naval technology in the period between 1880 and 1900 was almost fifty per  cent (!),
dwarfing the role of the Japanese domestic industry to somewhat of a mere subcontractor (18.7 % in
1890) —whereby the foreign wave of innovation must be regarded as a vector the value of which
can impossibly be expressed in numbers and percentages.78
As the reader  will  remember,  we encountered similar  arguments  about  the role of trade
partners when discussing continental European accounts of preference for monetary standards after
75 Nagura Bunji / Yokoi Katsuhiko / Onozuka Tomoji, nichi-ei heiki sangyō to ji-mensu jiken, p. 17.
76 On the role of steel and iron imports in this early period of Japanese militarism, see,
convincingly: Kojima Seiichi 小島精一, 『日本鉄鋼史・明治篇』 nihon tekkō shi-meiji hen (A
history of Iron and Steel in Japan -the Meiji volume) (Tokyo, 1945), esp. pp. 189ff., where he
quotes a speech by then prime minister Matsukata Masayoshi, directly addressing the cost of
relying on imports and Japan's ambition for industrial independence:
'To meet the needs of our national defense, the army urgently requires more weapons, better
explosives, and the construction of batteries, and the navy is in dire need of warships.
Howevere, as of this time, we heavily depend on imported iron and steel in producing
weapons and ships. This is not only extremely costly, but also exposes us to the high risk of
not being able to obtain the required [iron and steel] in the event of national emergence.'
Kojima, nihon tekkō shi, p. 189; English translation taken from Kozo Yamamura, 'Success
Illgotten?', p. 126.
77 Nagura Bunji / Yokoi Katsuhiko / Onozuka Tomoji, nichi-ei heiki sangyō to ji-mensu jiken, p. 19,
table 1-1.
78 Nagura Bunji / Yokoi Katsuhiko / Onozuka Tomoji, nichi-ei heiki sangyō to ji-mensu jiken, p. 19.
For a broader discussion on the role of foreign technology in Japan's quest for technology
independence, see: Suzuki Jun 鈴木淳, 『明治の機械工業・その生成と展開』 meiji no kikai kōgyō
—sono seisei to tenkai (Machinery production in the Meiji period —its origins and development)
(Tokyo, 1998).
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1873. For the merchant class, as said, there existed no arguments in favor of any intrinsic good of a
certain monetary standard; what prevailed was the concern about the facilities of exchange when
dealing with foreign merchants. For the pragmatic Matsukata, the monetary problem may have been
basically identical, although he probably also realized the political consequences this entailed. The
lessons of the Continental European nationalisms were thus encountered in a completely different
geographical setting at a completely different historical time: monetary choices as an expression for
one's geopolitical positioning, economic destiny, and technological orientation.79
79 For a modern and provocative example of the political meaning of monetary matters, see: Mark
Metzler, 'The Road to the Dollar Standard -Monetary Hegemony and Japan's Place in the
International Order', In: The Japanese Economy 30-3 (June 2002): 46-81.  
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